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Intermodal Transportation and the
Freight Forwarder*
The American system of transport regulation, itself compartmental-
ized, restricts individual companies to a single mode of transportation
-road, rail, air or water.' When a shipment moves by some intermodal
combination, responsibility for the job must be divided among several
carriers. This may lead to serious problems in coordinating intermodal
shipments and can force shippers to use less efficient means of transpor-
tation.
The solution most frequently proposed is the creation of so-called
"department store" or integrated transportation companies, selling any
combination of intermodal services. The railroads, the chief proponents
of the integrated transportation company, have long sought permission
to diversify into other modes of transportation. They argue that only
the intermodal transportation company will permit the shipper to select
the most efficient combination of transportation services. "Such co-
ordinated service cannot be supplied by any of the forms of transporta-
tion acting independently, nor as a practical matter is it reasonable to
* This student Comment was co-winner of the Israel H. Peres Prize for Volume 76,
given for the best student contribution to the volume; the other winner was Judicial
Control of Secret Agents, Issue 5.
1. The Interstate Commerce Act requires approval of intermodal mergers or acquisi.
tions involving carriers subject to ICC jurisdiction. Relatively more stringent restrictions
are placed on rail expansion into other forms of transportation. Section 5(2) of the Act,
49 U.S.0. § 5(2) (1964). The National Transportation Policy requires the Interstate
Commerce Commission "to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each [mode
of transportation]," and to avoid rates which involve "unfair or destructive competitive
practices." Declaration of National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 (1940). In 1959, the
Supreme Court ruled that the ICC was required to promote the continued viability of
independently-owned modes of transportation. American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States,
364 U.S. 1(1960). See Beardsley, Integrated Ownership of Transportation Companies and
the Public Interest, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 85 (1962).
The Federal Aviation Act gives the Civil Aeronautics Board similar powers over surface
carrier acquisition or control of air carriers. 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1964).
Only the Federal Maritime Commission is not empowered to control entry at all and
hence is not involved in the supervision of intermodal competition. Shipping Act of 1916,
46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1964); Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933, 46 U.S.C. §§ 843-48 (1964).
Water carriers in domestic commerce, other than domestic offshore commerce, are subject




suppose that it could be provided voluntarily through establishment of
joint rates and through routes. '-
Their opponents rarely meet the issue of efficiency square on. Instead,
they normally argue that the stronger mode of transportation-inevita-
bly the railroad-will be able to use its absolutely larger financial re-
sources to obtain a transportation monopoly.3 The end result will be
monopoly profits to the railroads and a reduction in the broad range of
services available to shippers under the present system of independent
ownership. The most fearful are the motor and barge carriers, who
envisage the use of rail-owned carriers as "fighting ships" to channel
traffic to the railroads and to drive out independent carriers.4 While the
aviation industry is less afraid of being taken over by rail interests, it
argues that the involvement of surface carriers in air transportation will
tend to restrict its development.5
The substantial integration of the existing regulatory agencies which
the integrated transportation company would require is sure to cause
additional opposition. It is surprising that these political and adminis-
trative barriers to the "department store" carrier have not caused more
effort to go into discovering other ways of achieving the benefits of in-
tegration. One alternative to the "department store" carrier, little con-
sidered in transportation literature, is giving the wholesalers of the
transportation industry, the freight forwarders, full freedom to operate
in all modes of transportation. In the role of transportation coordinator,
the freight forwarder is immune to the principal argument against the
integrated transportation company: it does not threaten the survival
of non-rail carriers and it does not create the danger of monopoly power.
The freight forwarder can provide efficient intermodal service with a
much less drastic restructuring of the regulatory framework than that
required for the integrated transportation company. Moreover, the
freight forwarder primarily serves the shipper who most needs co-
2. Loomis, Common Ownership in Transportation, in IssuEs IN Tr ANSrrAnoN
EcoNoAncs 200,201 (K. Ruppenthal ed. 1965).
3. This fear of rail domination goes back at least as far as the Panama Canal Act of
1912, which prohibited a railroad from owning, operating, or controlling an), water carrier
operating via the Canal or elsewhere with which the railroad was in competition, 49
U.S.C. § 5(14)-(16) (1964). For discussion of the purposes and the applications of this Act
see Lake Line Applications Under Panama Canal Act, 33 I.C.C. 699, 710-14 (1915).
4. See, e.g., Hearings on Transportation Diversification (H.R. 7960, etc.), iefore a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sms.
(1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 Transport Diversification Hearings]; Special Study Group,
National Transportation Policy: Preliminary Draft of a Report Prepared for the Senate
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 496 (1961); Coordination
Imong Modes of Transportation, 33 ICC Paac. J. 27 (1965).
5. See 1960 Transport Diversification Hearings 354, 357-58 (Statement of Air Transport
ssociation of America).
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ordinated intermodal service-the smaller shipper who does not have
sufficient market power to "persuade" carriers to handle his shipments
in the most efficient manner.
Characteristics of the Freight Forwarder
A freight forwarder is a common carrier that operates no transporta-
tion equipment." This paradoxical definition is based on common law
rules governing the liability of carriers to shippers: The courts have
consistently ruled that any person who offers to sell transportation to
the general public will be treated by the courts as a common carrier.
7
The freight forwarder comes within these rules because it contracts
with shippers for the transportation of property between two points,
and then turns around and contracts in its own name with an equip-
ment-operating carrier for the actual shipment of the property. The
freight forwarder is commonly termed an "indirect" carrier, while the
carriers providing the actual transportation services are "direct" or
"underlying" carriers.
Freight forwarders generally handle small shipments;
8 the large-
volume shipper normally buys transportation service directly from the
underlying carriers. The forwarder is able to compete with the direct
carriers because the direct carriers normally charge less per pound for
large than for small shipments. The forwarder consolidates a number
of small shipments (bound for the same general area) and ships them
together at carload or truckload rates, arranging for the distribution of
each individual shipment to its ultimate consignee after arrival at a
"break-bulk" point.9 In this kind of service, the forwarder's profit comes
6. With the unimportant exception of pickup and delivery equipment.
7. The history of regulation of the freight forwarder as a common carrier under
common law may be found in H. BENNETT, THE COMMISION AND TIE COMMON LAw 25-33
(1964), and Abeam, Freight Forwarders and Common Carriage, 15 FoRISAt L. Rm. 248,
252-60 (1946), together with the nineteenth century cases cited in both works. Originally,
the forwarder was simply an intermediary between the shipper and the carrier, serving as
an agent of the shipper to procure transportation for him. When the fonarder came to
hold himself out to the general public as a provider of transport services, the courts
concluded that he should be treated as a common carrier.
8. The average weight of surface forwarder shipments in 1964 was 464 pounds. It had
been as high as 460 pounds at the end of World War II, and had slumped to 350 pounds
by 1958. The rise since 1958 is probably due to increased fonrarder utilization of trailer-
on-flatcar ["TOFC"] services as a basis for solicitation of larger shipments. ICC, .BtuAu
OF TRANSPORT ECONOmICS, TRANSPORT STATISTICS IN TIlE UNrE STATES (PART 8) (annual)
[hereinafter cited as TRANSPORT STATISTICS (PART 8)]. In 1964 the average domestic air
forwarding shipment was about 40 pounds; the average international air forwarding
shipment was about 105 pounds. CAB, Bureau of Operating Rights, Information Exlibit
No. 2, p. 2, in Docket 16857, Motor Carrier-Air Freight Forwarder Investigation (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Information Exhibit, Docket 16857].
9. Section 402(a)(5) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 56 Stat. 284 (1942), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 1002(a)(5) (1964), defines a freight forwarder as any person:
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from the spread betveen the direct carriers' rates for small and for large
shipments.
If the forwarder is able to provide better service than the underlying
carriers, it may be able to charge a premium for its services, competing
with the direct carrier in weight ranges where there is little profit in
simple consolidation service.10 Alternatively, the forwarder may be able
to charge a premium simply because of the benefits to the shipper of
single carrier service.
Two pre-1920 Supreme Court decisions prevent the underlying car-
riers from discriminating for or against freight forwarders. In the later
of these, the 1917 Lehigh Valley decision, the Court ruled that the
freight forwarder was a shipper in relation to the railroads, and could
receive rates no lower than those published by the railroads for other
shippers tendering similar shipments.' The earlier case prohibited
railroads from discriminating against the freight forwarder by treating
the forwarder as a dummy and charging it higher rates based upon each
separate shipment in the hands of the forwarder.'2 These two decisions
together made it dear that although the freight forwarder is a common
carrier in relation to shippers, it is a shipper in relation to the regulated
direct carriers.13
which ... holds itself out to the general public as a common carrier to transport or
provide transportation of property, or any class or classes of property, for compensa-
tion, in interstate commerce, and which, in the ordinary and usual course of its
undertaking, (A) assembles and consolidates . . . shipments of such property, and
performs ... break-bulk and distributing operations with respect to such consolidated
shipments, and (B) assumes responsibility for the transportation of such property
from point of receipt to point of destination, and (C) utilizes, for the whole or any
part of the transportation of such shipments, the services of a carrier or carriers
subject to Part I, II, or MI of this Act.
The CAB regulations provide a parallel definition for air freight forwarders, 14 CM.R
§§ 296.2(a), 297.2 (1966).
10. The forwarder may provide better pickup and delivery service, or greater ability
to trace shipments and guarantee arrival times. Emery Air Freight, the largest and most
profitable air forwarder, charges premium rates for its service. It advertises and apparently
succesfully provides ground services superior to those provided by the direct air carriers or
other air forwarders. CAB, Bureau of Operating Rights, Direct Exhibit No. 7, pp. 1-4, in
Docket 16857, Motor Carrier-Air Freight Forwarder Investigation (1966) [hereinafterdited as Direct Exhibit, Docket 16857].
11. Lehigh Valley R.R V. United States, 243 U.S. 444 (1917).
12. ICC V. Delaware, L. & W..R., 220 US. 25 (1911). If the forwarder contracted with
two different shippers to move a 500-pound shipment for each, and tendered these ship-
ments to the direct carrier as a single 1000-pound shipment, the direct carrier could not
treat the shipment for rate-computation purposes as two 500-pound shipments.
13. The doctrine of these cases was extended to other surface and air modes of
transportation as they came under regulation, although there was some hesitation in the
CAB before applying it. See Airfreight Forwarder Investigation, 21 CAM3. 536, 558-59
(1955) (allowing preferential rate agreements), and supplemental opinions to this decision
at 23 CA.B. 376 (1956), 24 CA.B. 755, 757-58 (1957) (on reconsideration, disalloing
preferential treatment). In the 1957 opinion, the CAB ruled that there was no evidence
that Congress, in providing for indirect air carrier regulation, had intended to change the
1363
The Yale Law Journal
The Freight Forwarder as a Means of Transportation Integration
In the search for more efficient allocation of transportation resources,
the forwarder's great advantage is its ability, on a small capital invest-
ment, to offer the "department store" service advocated so strongly by
the proponents of direct carrier diversification.' 4 There are no inherent
limitations on the choice of routes and transportation modes that it can
provide for shippers. An integrated direct carrier, operating on a similar
scale, would represent a concentration of economic power that would
dwarf the largest American railroads.
Moreover, the forwarder caters primarily to the smaller shipper, who
finds it most difficult to determine and obtain the most economical
transportation mix. The high volume shipper typically can afford to
maintain his own traffic management staff: he will have the economic
muscle (in many cases through his ability to resort to private carriage)
to bring recalcitrant direct carriers to "understand" his transportation
requirements. The freight forwarder can supply both the expertise in
traffic management and the economic muscle which the small shipper
lacks.
On the other hand, the forwarder is unlikely to have appreciable
market power vis-h-vis individual shippers. Insignificant capital require-
ments make it easy to enter freight forwarding. A one-railroad town
with too little freight volume to justify an additional direct rail carrier
may be able to support several forwarders. 6
A further advantage of intermodal freight forwarder service stems
from the forwarder's indifference to the relative fortunes of the various
modes of transportation. At present, non-rail carriers fear that the rail-
roads, if allowed to expand into other forms of transportation, would
conduct non-rail operations solely or primarily for the purpose of in-
creasing rail traffic, and would hinder the technological and economic
development of non-rail transport. 17 The forwarder does not have sunk
traditional rule that, for rate regulation purposes, freight forwarders are to be treated
as shippers in relation to direct carriers.
The extent to which the doctrine of these cases applies to maritime transportation Is
unclear. See p. 1385 infra.
14. See 1960 Transport Diversification Hearings 91, Statement of Alfred E. Perlman,
President of the New York Central Railroad: "A true transportation company could offer
its customers the best service its management could devise . . . .The service would be
tailored to meet the needs of the customer-in terms of speed, flexibility, handling, and of
cost."
15. Forwarder investment in plant and equipment is discussed infra at notes 08-79,
and pp. 1375-76.
16. The 1966-67 New Haven telephone directory lists at least ten ICC-regulated surface
forwarders-all serving a town itself served only by a limping, bankrupt railroad.
17. See, e.g., Beardsley, supra note 1; 1960 Transport Diversification Hearings 359.
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costs in transportation right of way and long-lived equipment. Because
forwarder investment requirements are not closely related to any par-
ticular mode of transportation, the forwarder will be without a finan-
cial stake in any particular mode.'8 Naturally, the forwarder will be
attracted to the transportation service where profit margins are greatest.
But rate competition among forwarders, coupled with the shippers'
pressure for satisfactory service standards, should make fonarder bias
toward any mode of transportation short-lived.
The forwarder, one may presume, will also be better informed than
the small or infrequent shipper about the quality of service performed
by competing direct carriers, and will be under competitive pressure to
obtain the best possible service from direct carriers. No doubt the small
shipper eventually discovers the inadequacies of a given direct carrier,
but the adjustment process is slower and the pressure upon the carrier
less effective.
The freight forwarder can also play an important role in the growth
of container services.' 9 Containers compatible for use by different modes
of transportation minimize the cost of transferring cargo between trans-
portation modes-an expense that at present cuts deep into the savings
of efficient intermodal combinations of carriers. As containerization re-
places conventional methods of freight handling, intermodal service be-
comes relatively more efficient, and a wider market appears for the co-
ordinating services of the intermodal freight forwarder.
Some surface forwarders are already deeply engaged in container or
TOFC ("trailer-on-flatcar") operations. -° The great pressure, however,
on conventional methods of transportation will come when container-
ship services begin on a large scale.21 Once containerships are opera-
tional, forwarders at inland points will be able to accept trailer-load
shipments or to consolidate individual shipments into trailer-loads, and
through container service will be available from inland United States
18. A forwarder may have an investment of some size in containers or trailers for
TOFC service. But containers are the antithesis of bonds to a particular mode of
transportation.
19. This is not the place for extended discussion of the various forms of container
service available at present or in the near future. It does seem clear, however, that con.
tainers provide the most promising tool for obtaining the maximum gains from intermnodal
coordination. Lichtenstein, Container Age Is Coming Near, I:NTrERNATIo.AL Comtmct:,
December 6, 1955, at 2-8.
20. United States Freight Company, the large freight forwarder holding company, has
long been an advocate of domestic TOFC service by forwarders. Guzzardi, Freight Goes
Forwarder with Forgash, FORTUmNE, July 1962, at 152-95.
21. Presently, most or all major shipping companies are moving rapidly into the acqui-
sition or construction of ships suitable for container service. See Lichtenstein, supra note
19; What Comes After Containers, 222 TnE EcoNos'isT 50 (1967).
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points to inland European points, eliminating all enroute handling of
cargo32
One crucial problem for international container shipments is achiev-
ing "clear allocation of responsibility for each stage of movement" from
inland point to inland point.23 The simplest way is to have one carrier
control the movement of the container from source to destination.
24
This is a natural responsibility for freight forwarders, which offer single
carrier liability over a journey utilizing more than one carrier and
mode of transportation. There may be even more scope for the indirect
carrier in international commerce than in domestic commerce, because
the "department store" integrated direct carrier is bound to run into
political stumbling blocks at international frontiers. No European
country is likely to face with equanimity the prospect of the Penn-
Central lines operating extensive motor carrier services within its bor
ders. A freight forwarder, coordinating a shipment from its home base
in the United States, is a far less noxious intruder.
The Lack of Uniformity in Present Freight Forwarder Regulation
The intermodal freight forwarder cannot be expected to emerge
without changes in the pattern of forwarder regulation. Today a for-
warder must deal with a new agency each time it uses a different mode
of transportation. Forwarders which utilize the services of common car-
riers under ICC regulation are subject to Part IV of the Interstate Com-
merce Act.25 The forwarder shipping via aircraft is an "indirect air car-
rier" under the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board.20 The
forwarder operating in the domestic offshore and international mari-
time trade is under Federal Maritime Commission jurisdiction.27 To
22. North Atlantic Container Experiment, TRAFFIc Wopa., October 29, 1966, at 100.
United States Freight Company, together with several ocean carriers In which It has sub.
stantial stock holdings, has recently made through container service available from the
inland United States to European points, designed to lower transportation costs for small
shippers, N.Y. Times, March 7, 1967, at 82, col. 5.
23. North Atlantic Container Experiment, supra note 22. Both the government-spon.
sored experimental shipment and the United States Freight operations were hampered by
overlapping and conflicting administrative controls, including both transportation and
customs regulations.
24. When "one carrier takes full responsibility and the through rate is subject only to
division between carriers-you have pretty much the ultimate in a competitive system."
Schmeltzer, Container Revolution Termed Inevitable, TRAFF c Womw, November 5, 1966,
at 26.
25. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001-22 (1964).
26. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1964); 14 C.F.R. §§ 296-97 (1966).
27. The statutes controlling the FMC, supra note 1, do not mention the indirect marl.
time carrier. The maritime indirect carrier is, in general, subject to the same regulation as
the direct carrier. See Common Carriers by Water-Status of Non-Vessel Carriers, 6 F.M.B.
245 (1961); 30 Fed. Reg. 1849 (1965) [discussing the indirect carrier by water in relation to
an amendment to 46 C.F.R. § 510.22(c)]; note 61 infra.
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make intermodal freight forwarding an attractive business proposition,
the conflicts and cross currents in transport regulation must be elimi-
nated.
The ICC Freight Forwarder
As one might suspect, forwarders under the jurisdiction of the ICC
have the most stringent regulatory burden.28 Before anyone can com-
mence forwarder service he must obtain a permit from the ICC, based
on a finding that the applicant is "ready, able, and willing" and that
the proposed service is "consistent with the public interest and the na-
tional transportation policy."29 Until 1958, forwarder permits were
generally available to anyone capable of providing forwarder serviceY0
In 1957, however, Congress in effect deleted from the original freight
forwarder act a provision which had prohibited the ICC from denying
a permit solely on the grounds of competition with other forwarders.3'
This was interpreted by the Commission as a license to deny new per-
mits solely on the grounds of competition with existing forwarders.
Since 1958, the ICC has "found it incumbent in determining applica-
tions for freight forwarder authority to make a subsidiary finding as to
whether existing service is adequate to meet the evident needs of the
supporting shippers." 32 Today forwarder entry is all but impossible
28. Hereinafter the forwarder subject to ICC regulation will normally be termed a
"surface forwarder." Forwarders subject to the ICC are defined in the Act as indirect car-
riers who utilize for the transportation they sell the services of common carriers-rail, road
or water-regulated by the ICC. 49 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(5) (1964).
29. 49 U.S.C. § 1010(c) (1964). The surface forwarder permit does not normally grant
unlimited geographic operation rights. In 1957, only five of eighty.nine forwarders holding
permits were authorized to serve all points in the continental United States, although six
more served all states from specified origins. Frank P. Dow Co., 522 I.C.C. 103, 124 (194).
On the other hand, these nationwide carriers dominate the industry. See 1964 TRANsorT
STATrrcs (PART 8).
30. In 1948, the ICC denied that the public interest required that surface forwarder
entry be restricted in order to prevent dilution of traffic and wastage, or that entry could
be restricted simply because the new service would compete with existing forwarders. Lif-
schultz Fast Freight Extension, 265 I.C.C. 431, 439.44 (1948), aff'd sub nor. Acme Fast
Freight, Inc. v. United States, 338 U.S. 855 (1949) (per curiam). In a later decision, the
ICC described its pre-1958 policy as holding that
where shippers desired and would use the newly competitive forwarder service pro-
posed, authorization of that service would be consistent with the public interest and
the national transportation policy unless it was shown that institution of the new
service would result in serious impairment of existing forwarder service.
Frank P. Dow Co., 322 LC.C. 103, 111-12 (1964).
31. 49 U.S.C. § 1010(d) (1964). The provision was left in effect only insofar as It applied
to rail-controlled applicants, the evident purpose of this exception being to preserve the
ability of railroads to set up forwarders to handle their increasing unprofitable LCL traffic.
See H.R. REP. No. 880, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957).
32. Frank P. Dow Co., 322 LC.C. 103, 113 (1964). See also Norman G. Jensen, Inc., 318
I.C.C. 719, 724 (1963) ('A finding of inadequacy.. , is therefore penultimate to a finding
of need for a new similar service. .. )
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unless one can show, at the threshold, that existing service is inade-
quate.3
3
Forwarder rates, like those of other common carriers under ICC juris-
diction, may be suspended for investigation upon filing or may be chal-
lenged at any time. The forwarder is forbidden to establish unjust or
unreasonable rates or to create undue preference or discriminations
among persons or places. 34 The ICC is empowered to set maximum and
minimum or actual forwarder rates. The pattern of forwarder rate
regulation parallels motor and rail carrier rate regulation, except that
there is less argument about the level of costs in forwarder rate cases, for
about 70 per cent of forwarder costs, on average, are for current
outlays to direct carriers for transportation services. 35 Surface forwarder
rates are commonly on a par with the rates of whichever direct carrier
is the closest competitor for the traffic involved.30 The competitive ad-
vantages of the surface forwarders today are largely service advantages
-greater speed of service, single carrier liability, ease of tracing ship-
ments, and minimization of the need for shipper contact with carriers."'
The law restricts ICC freight forwarders to the use of direct common
carriers for the transportation services they provide, excepting "the per-
formance within terminal areas of transfer, collection or delivery ser-
vices."38s Within terminal areas, the forwarder may provide his own col-
lection and delivery service, or may hire an unregulated trucker.3 0
33. The words of the amendment are permissive and not mandatory. The fact that tile
ICC has interpreted them so strictly against the policy of free entry into surface forward-
ing reveals the Commission's attitude toward competition.
34. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1005-06 (1964).
35. 1964 TRANSPORT STATISTICS (PART 8).
36. Statement of Giles Morrow, General Counsel, Freight Forwarders Institute, Hearhgs
on the Transportation Act of 1963 (H.R. 4700 and H.R. 4701) Before the House Comnt. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 530-32 (1963).
37. Id. The surface forwarders grossed $487 million in 1964, handling almost 20 million
shipments weighing a total of about 4.4 million tons. Net after-tax profits were $5.1 million,
but if the loss for Republic Carloading is excluded, the net industry profits were about
$6.9 million. 1964 TRANSPORT STATISTICS (PART 8). (Republic Carloading was purchased by
Yale Express in early 1964; the combined firms went bankrupt in early 1965 due largely to
poor management of the acquiring firm. See Whalen, The Big Skid at Yale Express, Folt.
TUNE, November 1965, at 144.) Of total 1964 revenues, about $163 million went straight to
the railroads for line-haul transportation expenditures, and an additional $86 million went
to motor carriers for line-haul service. The proportion of line-haul transportation costs
flowing to motor carriers has been increasing steadily since 1957. Similarly, costs for assem.
bly and distributing service, as a proportion of the total, have been creeping upward. This
is probably due as much to increased distance of assembly and distribution movements as
to relatively greater costs of such movements. The most noteworthy change in forwarder
service in recent years is the growing forwarder reliance upon container and TOFC opera.
tions. In 1965, the forwarders originated about 11 per cent of the total number of trailers
moving in TOFC service. Interstate Commerce Commission, Transport Economics, March
1966, at 3.
38. 49 US.C. § 1018 (1964).
39. The unregulated trucker will most likely be a trucker operating under the terms of
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The law also restricts the ties of surface forwarders with other car-
riers. The provisions, however, are asymmetric, in that a direct carrier
(or person controlling a direct carrier) may acquire control of a for-
warder, but a forwarder (or person controlling a forwarder) may not
acquire control of a direct carrier.40 The apparent rationale of this sys-
tem was to permit railroads to create forwarder subsidiaries for their
small-shipment traffic, without allowing forwarders the supposed com-
petitive advantage of owning a captive direct carrier.41
The Air Freight Forwarder
Air forwarders, although operating no aircraft, are classified as in-
direct air carriers under section 101(3) of the Federal Aviation Act,
which defines as an air carrier anyone "who undertakes, whether directly
or indirectly . . . , to engage in air transportation," and then further
provides that the CAB may exempt air carriers "not directly engaged
in the operation of aircraft in air transportation" from such provisions
of the Act as it finds to be in the public interest. 2 In lengthy proceed-
ings between 1948 and 1958, the Board formulated rules applicable to
domestic and international air forwarding, the most important of
which permits air forwarders to operate without a certificate of public
convenience and necessity.4 3
In contrast to ICG-regulated forwarding, air forwarding is open to
anyone who can satisfy standards of capability and fitness, and complies
with certain insurance, reporting, and tariff-filing requirements.44 In
section 203(b)(8) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 303(b)(8) (1964), which permits
the ICC to exempt from economic regulation local cartage carriers within the commercial
area of any city, although they may be carrying commodities moving in interstate com.
merce.
40. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1010(c), 1011(a), (g) (1964).
41. Although the provisions permitting direct carrier control of surface forwarders
were probably originally intended to permit rail ownership of forwarders, recent )-ears have
seen the end of rail control of freight forwarders and the growth of motor carrier purchase
of forwarder. The ICC estimated in 1963 that perhaps as much as 50 per cent of total
forwarders tonnage was moved by firms owned by or under common control with motor
carriers. 77 ICC ANN. REP. 118 (1963). Some of the common control situations may involve
only small motor carriers, but two of the biggest forwarders, National Carloading and Re-
public Carloading, are owned by P.I.E. and Yale Express, respectively.
42. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1964). See Railway Express Agency, 2 C.A.B. 531 (1941), in which
the CAB decided that it would be inappropriate to grant indirect air carriers certificates
of public convenience and necessity under the terms of section 401 of the Civil Aeronautics
Act, now section 401 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1954).
43. Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B. 473 (1948); Air Freight Forwarder Case (In-
ternational), 11 C.A.B. 182 (1949); Airfreight Forwarder Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 536 (1955);
International Airfreight Forwarder Investigation, 27 C.A.B. 658 (1958). The rules formulated
by the CAB in these cases are at 14 C.F.R. §§ 296 (domestic air freight forwarding), 297
(international air freight forwarding) (1966).
44. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 296-97 (1966). The air forwarder is considerably more important
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1955, the Board was urged by several forwarders and direct air carriers
to require public hearings on forwarder applications to determine their
fitness and the existence of a public need for additional service. 46 It
replied that its staff was competent to determine fitness, and that a
public need test was only appropriate to the entry and certification of
direct air carriers. 40 "[T]he question whether a particular forwarder's
services would fill a public need [was] left to the judgment of the ship.
ping public itself."47 Air forwarding authorizations are granted sepa-
rately for domestic (interstate) and international (all other) service, but
otherwise impose no restrictions on points served or commodities car-
ried. An air forwarder may hold both domestic and international au-
thority. Rate regulation, like entry control, is left to competitive forces.
The Board rejected a 1958 plea by the airlines that it subject air for-
warders to minimum rate orders,48 and the issue has been moot since
minimum freight rates for direct air carriers were removed in 1961.40
The issue of outside financing and control of air forwarders has arisen
only in connection with surface carrier entry into air forwarding. Sec-
tion 408(b) of the Federal Aviation Act provides that ownership, opera-
tion, or control of air carriers by other air carriers or surface carriers
must be approved by the Board as being in the public interest.50 The
in air cargo transportation than is the surface forwarder in surface freight transportation.
In 1964, the air forwarders originated 22.2 per cent of domestic air cargo tonnage, while the
surface forwarders originated less than 1 per cent of rail tonnage. Information Exhibit No.
11, p. 1, Docket 16857; 1964 TRANSPORT STATISTICS (PART 8); 79 ICC ANN. Rnp. 155, Table 19
(1965). The air forwarders, however, move much less tonnage than the surface forwarders,
handling only 210,000 tons in domestic and international service together in 1964. Informa-
tion E~hibit No. 2, p. 2, Docket 16857. The air forwarding industry has one large firm-
Emery Air Freight-which, in 1964. originated about 30 er cent of domestic tonnage and
earned about two-thirds of the total profits in domestic ar forwarding. Direct Exhibit No.
7, pp. 14, Docket 16857. Most other large forwarders were in the black for their domestic
services, but few other international air forwarders did more than break even. Id.
45. Airfreight Forwarder Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 536, 54849 (1955).
46. Id. at 549-50.
47. Id. at 550. To provide some control over the number of outstanding forwarder au-
thorizations, the CAB will revoke them for failure to engage in forwarding over any two.
year period. 14 C.F.R. §§ 296.49, 297.44 (1966). From 1962 to 1965, the CAB revoked 22
dormant authorizations. Information Exhibit No. 4, Docket 16857.
48. Airfreight Rate Case, Minimum Rates for Airfreight Forwarders, 26 C.A.B. 339
(1958). The CAB concluded that the public interest would be best served if the forwarders
were permitted to set their prices to the public without regard to the rates of the direct
carriers. It reasoned that the imposition of minimum rates would raise small package prices,
and held that the appropriate regulatory policy was the encouragement of pricing based
on lowest possible costs: the air forwarders were held to specialize in the non line-haul
function of air transport and thereby able to achieve economies not open to the direct air
carrier. Id. at 341-42.
49. Minimum Rates Applicable to Airfreight, 34 C.A.B. 263 (1961). The one existing
exception to this rule is the Puerto Rican market, where minimum rates have been in effect
since early 1966. Docket No. 11278, New York-San Juan Cargo Rates Investigation, 2
Av. L. RE,. 21,646 (CAB, June 21, 1966); Id. at 21,618 (CAB, March 28, 1966),
50. 49 US.C. § 1378(b) (1964).
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CAB interprets the Act to apply a similar rule even when surface car-
riers desire to enter air transportation in their own names, rather than
through subsidiaries, a relationship not technically within the prohibi-
tions of section 408.51 It has denied surface carrier applications for air
forwarding authority when it believed that the surface carrier was not
wholeheartedly interested in the development of air transportation
services.
52
Air forwarders, like direct air carriers, may operate motor vehicles to
provide pickup and delivery service for cargo they handle. The Inter-
state Commerce Act exempts this service from motor carrier economic
regulation when it is "incidental to transportation by aircraft."14 Under
current ICC and CAB procedures, this is interpreted to permit exempt
service within about 25 miles of airports.5 4 Beyond this area, air for-
warders must have surface forwarding authority from the ICC, or must
turn the shipments over to ICC-regulated common carriers.
The Maritime Non-Vessel-Operating Common Carrier
The non-vessel-operating common carrier, the "NVO," has received
comparatively little attention., This obscurity reflects the structure of
51. Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 CA.B. 473, 502 (1948).
52. Id. at 510. The CAB granted air forwarding rights in this proceeding to about ten
small motor carriers, noting that their operations would be useful in the consolidation and
distribution ot air shipments. Id. at 508. It likewise granted the requests of independent
surface forwarders for air forwarding rights. Id. But it denied authority to rail-owned or
controlled air-forwarder applicants, arguing that their extensive facilities, together vith
rail financial backing, would be detrimental to the development of healthy competition
in the industry. Id. at 509-12, affd sub nor. National Air Freight Forwarding Corp. v.
CAB, 197 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1952). The CAB reversed itself seven )-ears after its original
decision on the grounds that the appearance of successful independent air forwarders
lessened the danger to competition posed by rail financial baddng. Airfreight Forwarder
Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 536, 545 (1955). The CAB has consistently refused to grant Railway
Express Agency a general airforwarding authorization, on the grounds that REA's contrac-
tual relations with the airlines for the provision of Air Express Service (a special cargo
servie using REA vehicles for expedited pickup and delivery service and having first load-
ing priority after passengers' baggage and the U.S. mails) would be inconsistent with REA
provision of air cargo services as an ordinary air freight forwarder. REA therefore remainsas a unique class of indirect air carrier. See Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A1B. 473, 4S9
(1948); Railway Express Agency, 2 C.A.B. 531 (1941). The Board is presently faced with the
decision of whether or not to grant the application of several very large motor carriers
for domestic and international forwarding authorizations. Docket 16857, Motor Carrier-Air Freight Investigati .on 19n record as opposed to the granting of au-thority, based on the great size of the tucking firm in relation to existing air forwarders
and on the fact that their "prime economic incentives are in a competing mode of trans-
portation." N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1967, at 86, col. 5.
53. 49 U.S.C. § 503(b)(7a) (1964).
54. See 14 C.F.R. § 222 (1966); Snow, Air Freight Forwarding: A Legal & Economic
Analysis, 32 J. oF Am L. & Co nt. 485 (1966); Note, Regulation of Air Freight Pichup and
Delivery, 76 YALE Lj. 405 (1966).
55. See 49 C.F.R. § 404.1 (1967 Supp.) (use of regulated motor common carrier service
by an air freight forwarder); 49 C.F.R. § 210A0 (1967 Supp.) ('motor transportation of
property incidental to transportation by aircraft').
56. Maritime forwarder regulation is made confusing by a problem in nomenclature.
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ocean carrier cargo tariffs, which, for the most part, make consolidation
unprofitable. The unit of carriage-the ship-is too large for the for-
warder to consolidate full loads, and the tariffs do not provide "weight
breaks" comparable to those which make air freight forwarding profit-
able.57 Most present NVO's are surface carriers which have expanded
into NVO operations in order to provide their inland customers with
through service to overseas points. It is expected that the increasing
use of containerized shipments in international transportation will
create a greater demand for NVO services in the maritime trade.58
The earliest case involving an NVO held that it was a common car-
rier by water because it had long-term cargo space contracts with the
vessel operator.59 Maritime regulation of freight forwarding was not
The Federal Maritime Commission describes the maritime indirect carrier as a "non.vessel-
operating common carrier" or "NVO." The "independent ocean freight forwarder" in the
maritime industry is not an indirect carrier, as described in this paper, but rather is an
agent of the shipper who procures transportation service for and in the name of the ship.
per. This paper is limited to an analysis of the indirect common carrier, and generic refer.
ences to "freight forwarders" or "Maritime forwarders" must therefore be understood to
refer only to the non-vessel-operating common carrier.
The difference in names stems from the fact that in the maritime trade, the old-style
"forwarder," serving as a shipper's agent, supra note 7, never disappeared. As a result,
when the indirect, maritime common carrier first appeared, a different name had to be
found. The FMC's predecessors simply adopted the functional name-"Non-vessel.operatlng
common carrier." See Investigation of Practices of Ocean Freight Forwarders, 6 F.M.B. 327
(1961); Agreements and Practices Pertaining to Brokerage, and Related Matters, 3 U.S.M.C.
170 (1949); Port of New York Freight Forwarder Investigation, 3 U.S.M.C. 157 (19-I9),
HOUSE COMM!. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, INVESTIGATION INTO TiE AarsTivies or
FOREIGN FREIGHT FORWARDERS AND BROKERS, H.R. REP. No. 2939, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
'In 1961, the Shipping Act of 1916 was amended to provide a statutory definition of the
independent ocean freight forwarder, and to provide for the licensing and rules of com-
pensation of independent ocean freight forwarders. 75 Stat. 522 (1961), 46 U.S.C. §§ 801,
841(b) (1964).
57. This fact helps explain the continued existence of the shippers' agent (the "inde-
pendent ocean freight forwarder") in the maritime industry. See discussion in note 56
supra. Because there has been little or no room for the forwarder to operate by consolidat.
ing shipments, the shipper has had to deal directly with the underlying carrier. But because
many shippers are at inland points where steamship operators have no offices, it has been
economically desirable to have agents at seaports to deal in the name of shippers with tie
underlying carriers. If the steamship operators structured their rates to encourage the
growth of the indirect carrier in the maritime trade, one would expect to see considerable
decimation of the "independent ocean freight forwarders" (the shippers' agents).
58. See pp. 1365-66 supra. Many motor carriers of household goods already provide
such service, using special household goods containers to provide through services re-
quiring no handling of the furnishings in transit. See Common Carriers by Water, supra
note 27. One of the country's largest motor carriers, Denver-Chicago, has been adver-
tising a similar general commodity service from the Midwest to Europe in conjunction
with a Holland-based motor carrier affiliate.
59. Alaskan Rates, 2 U.S.M.C. 558, 582 (1941). It was apparently the contract feature of
the Railway Express Agency transportation which led the Maritime Commission to term
REA a common carrier, for another firm which consolidated shipments to Alaska and
moved them under its own bill of lading, assuming full liability for loss and damage but
not making special contracts with the underlying carrier, was held not to be a common
carrier by water. Id. It is noteworthy that this decision was prior to both the CAB decision
holding REA to be an indirect air carrier, note 42 supra, and the 1942 Act placing surface
forwarders under ICC regulation, 56 Stat. 384 (1942), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001-22 (1964).
1372
Vol. 76: 1360, 1967
Freight Forwarder
brought into line with ICC and CAB regulation until 1952 when the
Federal Maritime Board held that the status of a common carrier
depends upon the nature of the service offered to the public, and not
upon the existence of any particular form of contractual relations be-
tween the NVO and the underlying carrierGO
Since the legislation governing the NVO does not distinguish be-
tween the NVO and the direct carrier, the regulatory powers of the
Federal Maritime Commission, successor to the FMB, must apply
equally to both.0 ' The NVO is required to file tariffs with the FMC and
to submit for review all agreements fixing rates or otherwise providing
for restrictions of competition among persons subject to FMC regula-
tions. 6 2 In the domestic offshore trade, the FMC has rate regulation
powers over common carriers similar to those of the ICC, but in foreign
trade, the FMG may only prescribe the form of tariffs, prohibit rebating,
and disapprove rates which it finds to be so unreasonably high or low
as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States. All com-
mon carriers and other persons subject to FMG authority must, how-
ever, avoid undue preferences or discriminations between persons,
places, or types of traffic. 4 Because the FMC cannot restrict entry into
direct maritime transportation, it cannot restrict entry into indirect
maritime transportation.
Present Law: The Need for Change
If the freight forwarder is to play an expanded role in the coordina-
tion and provision of intermodal transportation, this legal framework
must be rationalized. Not only different regulations but also different
philosophies of regulation govern the ICC surface forwarder and the
CAB air forwarder. The ICC treats surface forwarders as it does the
direct carriers, which is to say that the ICC tends to act something like
the governing body of a cartel, allocating business so that the survival
60. Bernhard Ulmann Co. v. Porto Rican Express Co., 3 U.S.M.C. 771 (FMB, 1952).
The Board was obviously influenced in Teaching its decision by its observation of the post-
1941 practice of the ICC and the CAB.
61. See maritime statutes cited note 1 supra. The NVO is mentioned in the FMC rcgu-
lations only in the course of distinguishing the NVO from the "independent ocean freight
forwarder." 46 C.F.R. § 510.21(d) (1966):
The term "non-vessel operating common carrier by water" means a person who holds
himself out ... to provide transportation for hire by water ... ; assumes respon-
sibility or has liability imposed by law for safe tranportation of shipments; and ar-
ranges in his own name with underlying water carriers for the performance of such
transportation .... "
62. Common Carriers by Water-Status of Non-Vessel Carriers, 6 F.M.B. 245 (1961).
63. 46 U.S.C. §§ 816-17 (1964).
64. 46 U.S.C. § 815 First (1964).
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of each mode of transportation is assured. The CAB views the air for-
warder largely as a tool for developing air freight, rather than as a
potential instrument of intermodal transport coordination. 0 So far, the
maritime agencies have not considered the NVO's important enough to
formulate a clear regulatory policy.
The development of intermodal freight forwarding depends upon
the answers to certain basic questions. Should the forwarder be limited
to small shipments which require consolidation and break-bulk ser-
vices? How much rate regulation is necessary? Are entry controls re-
quired? Can forwarders receive rates from carriers other than those
received by ordinary shippers in similar circumstances? Should forward-
ers be allowed to affiliate with direct carriers?
The following sections of this study examine the existing patterns of
forwarder regulation in more detail to determine the changes that
would facilitate intermodal forwarding. The form of certain recom-
mendations stems from the realization that it is normally easier to re-
interpret statutes or revise administrative regulations than to pass new
laws. Ideally, an agency with no ties to any particular mode of transpor-
tation should be responsible for freight forwarding. In practice, it will
probably be necessary to settle for representatives of the existing trans.
portation regulatory commissions sitting as an ad hoc agency for pur-
poses of forwarder regulation.
Entry into Freight Forwarding
The ICC's policy of restricting entry into freight forwarding makes
sense only as a means of protecting established forwarders from the
threat of additional competition. As discussed above, the ICC has taken
the 1957 amendment to section 410 of the Interstate Commerce Acto0
as a license to make new entrants show that service is inadequate before
they can receive operating permits. Both this amendment and the ICC's
interpretation appear to be founded upon the false belief that free
entry will involve "improvident and wasteful duplication of trans-
portation services and facilities." 6 The ICC's own figures indicate that
65. Cf. Airfreight Forwarder Investigation, 21 CA.B. 536, 546 (1955) ("our policy.
will stimulate the growth of airfreight and its utility to the public"), and Air Freight
Forwvarder Case, 9 C.A.B. 473, 509-12 (1948) (discussing the reasons for denial of air for-
warding authority to rail-controlled applicants).
66. 49 U.S.C. § 1010(d) (1964). See notes 31-33 supra, and pp. 1367-68.
67. This phrase appears in both the Senate and House Reports on the measure, s. R P.
No. 542, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1957); H.R. RE'. No. 880, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1957). It
was parroted by the Commission in West Coast Freight Co., 309 I.C.C. 123, 127 (1959), in
which a permit was denied, although no mention of the 1957 amendment appears any.
where in the decision,
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forwarders need only a minuscule investment in capital equipment,
which can easily be adapted to other uses if the forwarder is forced out
of business. In 1964, the railroads' total operating income was over
$9.5 billion; their net investment in transportation property was $24.9
billion.68 In that same year, the gross income of ICC-regulated for-
warders was $487 million, while their net investment in transportation
property was only $6 million.0 Thus the forwarders' capital-output
ratio is less than 1/200 that of the railroads.70 If all the forwarders went
out of business tomorrow and their transportation investment were
shot into space, the net loss to society would be less than 1/60 of the
annual rail passenger deficit.7 '
This figure may even overstate the amount of capital committed to
freight forwarding, because much of the equipment is readily transfer-
able to other uses. Most of the forwarder's investment is in pickup and
delivery vehicles and trailers or containers-both of which have a ready
resale market-and in consolidation and break-bulk facilities-which
also have substantial alternative use value. 2 Easy exit and entry are
68. 79 ICC ANN. REP'. 152, 153 (1965).
69. 1964 TRANsproR STATISTICS (PART 8).
70. Any argument that competitive forwarder services involve great danger of wasteful,
duplicative investment is lacking in candor. As two dissenters in the 1964 Dow case pointed
out, the number of forwarders holding ICC permits was actually decreasing from 1952 on-
wards, during the period in which the ICC was pressing for amendment of section 410(d).
In 1952, 96 forwarders held permits; in 1957 there were 89, and by 1964 there were only
82, 10 of which were inactive. Frank P. Dow Co., 322 I.C.C. 103, 124 (1954); 1964
TRANSPORT STATISTICS (PART 8). The 1957 amendment is thus perhaps best viewed as a light
between the haves and the have-nots within the industry, rather than a fight between es-
tablished firms and new entrants.
71. The deficit in 1964 was $410.2 million. 79 ICC ANN. REP. 80 (195). Alternatively.
the surface freight forwarders sometimes argue that unrestricted entry will bring more
competitors in any one market than there is traffic to support them, so that no one for-
warder will receive enough traffic to make consolidation profitable. See, e.g., Statement of
Giles Morrow, General Counsel, Freight Forwarders Institute, Hearings on Freight For-
warder Legislation (S. 3365, etc.) Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 41-43 (195. But there is no evidence that this
has ever occurred; the ICC's 1957 legislative recommendation noted only that "the Case
with 'which permits may be obtained... could result in overcrowding .... Letter from
the ICC to the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, id. at 4 (emphasis
added). And the statute makes provision for this possibility by permitting forwarders who
at any time are unable to consolidate sufficient traffic to use carload or truckload rates to
"joint load" and together obtain the carload rate advantage. 49 U.S.C. § 1004(d) (1964).
72. The forwarder's greatest capital requirement may be working capital. Normally,
the forwarder pays the underlying carrier before he collects from the shipper. This capital
requirement may be a hindrance to entry, but it certainly cannot be classified as an ele-
ment of wasteful investment likely to result from over-strenuous competition. Forwarder
tangible capital requirements are lessened by the ability of forwarders to lease much of
their plant and equipment: forwarders engaged in Plan IV TOFC service may lease the
flatcars necessary on a short term basis. Flatcars and trailers, of course, are readily usable
in any other form of TOFC service or by another forwarder if the lessee forwarder should
go out of business.
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fundamental characteristics of a market that is best regulated by com-
petition.73
Of course, regulation of entry into freight forwarding is not based
exclusively on the danger of wasteful investment. Forwarders are ex-
pected to offer common carrier standards of liability and care to ship-
pers-standards that shoestring entrants may be unable to meet. A
shipper should not have to check the Dun and Bradstreet rating of
every forwarder who competes for his business.
The CAB standards provide a reasonable compromise between
totally uncontrolled entry and the competition-restricting practices of
the ICC. Since air forwarder service was authorized in 1948, the Board
has continually rejected suggestions that air forwarders be required to
show a public need for their services.74 The CAB has wisely avoided
attempts to formulate any fixed criteria of fitness: in practice, it deter-
mines fitness on an ad hoc basis from the forwarder's application, which
provides general information about the transportation background of
applicant's managing personnel, its financial resources, its chief stock-
holders and its relations with other transportation-connected enter-
prises.7 5 The direct financial interests of the public and air forwarder
customers are protected by mandatory forwarder insurance require-
ments. These mild regulations have been sufficient to keep the industry
stable, contrary to the predictions of the advocates of restrictions on
free entry.76
73. It does not appear that there are any substantial economies of scale in surface
forwarding. In 1964, Frank P. Dow Co. earned 6.0% on gross revenues of 5650,000; Midland
Forwarding earned 4.2% on $4.4 million; National Carloading earned 0.9% on $35.4 mil.
lion; and Universal Carloading earned 1.1% on $73.4 million. 1964 T rANSPoar STATISTIC9
(PART 8) 8-9. This is not to imply that there are necessarily diseconomies of scale: Western
Carloading, the most profitable forwarder in terms of dollar earnings, earned 6.1% on gross
revenues of $43.0 million. Id.
As long ago as 1948, the ICC stated that it ought to be able to deny forwarder permit
applications when existing service was considered "adequate." See Lifschultz Fast Freight,
265 I.C.C. 431, 438-39 (1948), afi'd sub nor. Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. United States, 338
U.S. 855 (1949) (per curiam). But the prior existence of "adequate service" should be ir-
relevant unless entry into an "adequately-served" market is shown to correspond inevitably
with such undesirable results as impairment of service to shippers or uneconomic Invest-
ment by carriers. This the ICC has never done. The use of the "adequate service" rubric
removes all danger of competitive pressure from new entrants into surface forwarding. It
would not be feasible for the ICC to formulate standards for "adequate" service which
would approximate the standards which would be imposed on the industry if there were
free entry.
74. See pp. 1369-70 supra; Airfreight Forwarder Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 536, 549
(1955).
75. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 296.42, 297.32 (1966) for the information required of air forwarder
applicants. Most applications which do not involve questions of surface carrier participa.
tion in air forwarding appear to be granted. Applicants whose initial applications are
rejected by CAB staff are entitled to submit new information and to request a public
hearing. 14 C.F.R. §§ 296.43, 297.34 (1966).
76. E.g., the pessimistic dissenting opinion of Member Jones in the 1948 case, 9 C.A.B.
437, 523-24.
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These standards are an appropriate pattern for uniform treatment of
forwarder entry by the three regulatory agencies. Section 410 of the In-
terstate Commerce Act need not prevent the ICC from adopting them.
The Commission only has to determine as a matter of policy that it is
not in the public interest, as that phrase is used in section 410(c), to
deny permits on the grounds of adequate existing service77 Only if the
ICC refuses to change its present position will legislation be required.
Forvarders ought to be spared the ordeal of appearing before two or
three separate agencies to obtain permission for intermodal service.
One approach, if the ICC can be persuaded to change its entry policy,
is to have the staff of each agency jointly evaluate applications and
simultaneously submit identical recommendations for agency approval.
If the Commission refuses to accept a change in its policy on forwarder
entry, the most satisfactory solution would be legislation, along the
lines of the unsuccessful Transportation Act of 1963, establishing a
joint board with an equal number of members from each of the three
transport agencies.7 8 This board would have power to decide whether
or not the potential forwarder has the minimal technical competence
and financial backing necessary to safeguard the interests of the shipping
public and the direct carriers. Existing forwarders, operating in only
one mode of transportation, would have grandfather rights to that ser-
vice, but ought, like new entrants, to satisfy the minimum fitness re-
quirements for any expansions of their service to different modes. It
is implausible that any of the expansion-minded firms currently oper-
ating would not be able to satisfy such tests; and the form of test pro-
posed, involving as it does no public hearing, should be no great burden
upon them.
Quantitative Limitations on Forwarder Service
Even under a policy of free entry, there may be dispute over the
physical limits on freight forwarder service. Specifically, should the for-
warder be allowed to handle shipments on which he performs no con-
solidation service? Presently the ICC, the CAB and the FMC all have
different rules governing this question, but intermodal forwarders will
require a single standard. Although the forwarder is routinely described
as a carrier which makes its living consolidating small shipments into
77. 49 U.S.C. § 1010(c) (1964).
78. S. 1062, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), section 4(b). The text may be found in Hearings
on S. 1061 and S. 1062 Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 7-9 (1963).
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truckloads or carloads, there is no reason why it must be limited to such
service.79 If the shipper is prepared to pay a premium for single carrier
responsibility and service, especially in international air and maritime
transportation, he should be permitted to do so.8 0
The Interstate Commerce Act and the regulations of the CAB both
define the indirect carrier as one which "in the ordinary and usual
course of its undertaking" assembles and consolidates, and break$ bulk
and distributes, shipments.8' The requirement of assembly and consoli-
dation places a potential limitation upon the size of shipments which
the forwarder may handle, for the forwarder who receives straight car-
loads or truckloads from shippers performs no consolidation services.
In the case of the CAB, this limitation is only potential. The phrase
"ordinary and usual" is not in the Federal Aviation Act, but in the
regulations. Moreover, the CAB has made no effort to restrict the size
or weight of air forwarder shipments. The present regulations permit
both the international and the domestic air forwarder to charter air-
craft, which would seem to authorize the forwarder to handle full plane-
load shipments.
8 2
The ICC, however, interprets "ordinary and usual" less freely, al-
though the precedents are confusing. In 1961, it seemed to say that
some activity which can be labelled as consolidation and break-bulk
services is a prerequisite for the performance of all surface forwarder
service.83 And regardless of shipment size and weight, if the surface
forwarder is primarily engaged in handling truckload and carload lots,
without assembly and consolidation, the ICC presently will hold him
to be operating beyond the limits of his authority.8 4 But in the 1966
79. Discussion about the issues in forwarder rate regulation raised by large volume
forwarder shipments will be postponed to the following section.
80. As pointed out above, p. 1364 supra, the large volume shipper is likely to have
less need for the services of a forwarder. He has the size to justify maintaining his own
internal traffic management staff, who will be familiar with the alternative transportation
possibilities available from each mode of transportation. But even the large volume
shipper may have occasional unusual shipments with which his staff has no experience,
81. ICC: 49 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (1964); CAB: 14 CY.R. §§ 296.2, 297.2 (1966).
82. 14 C.F.R. §§ 296.22, 297.22 (1966).
The ability of forwarders to charter aircraft does not mean that the air forwarder Is
going to be able to obtain rates which the shipper of air freight cannot obtain: the shipper
is free to charter as well, so that if he can make use of the full capacity of the plane, lie Is
in the same position as the air forwarder. The discussion at pp. 1379.80 infra, applies,
mutatis mutandis, to air transportation.
83. Boots or Shoes from Bel Camp, Md., 313 I.C.C. 137, 138 (1961) (forwarder "volume
rate" for light-loading shoes held to involve the forwarder in direct shlipper-to.conslgnee
truckload movements, which were "not a freight-forwarder service').
84. Motor Rail Co., 296 I.C.C. 205, 214-15 (1955) (". . . Motor Rail's preponderant
operations ...are the transportation of full truckload shipments of specific commodi-
ties . . . ).
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Brinke case, with no mention of its 1961 position, the Commission
ruled that "[i]n order to retain the status of freight forwarder, it is not
necessary for applicant to assemble and consolidate, and break bulk and
distribute as to every shipment which he handles."85 Moreover, in an
earlier case, the Commission had stretched the concept of assembly and
distribution to the breaking point by accepting forwarder provision of
TOFC service: the forwarder was found to be providing assembly and
consolidation service within the Act when he places two trailers, each
from a separate shipper and filled only with the goods of that shipper,
on a single flatcar.8
The two sets of cases may be reconciled by noting that in the 1961
decision, the Commission was striking down filings which would inevi-
tably produce carload or truckload movements, and therefore would
never involve consolidations. Thus rates which produce trailerload
movements for TOFC service, where there is pro forma consolidation
of two trailers on one flatcar, would be outside the proscription of the
1961 ICC decision.87
Nevertheless, given its precedents, the ICC would have to act affirma-
tively to establish the right of freight forwarders under its jurisdiction
to handle shipments of any size. 8 But if the ICC is willing, legislative
change would be unnecessary, for the phrase "ordinary and usual" is
flexible enough to encompass occasional shipments for which no con-
solidation or break-bulk services are performed. An interpretation of
85. Brinke Freight Forwarder Application, 326 I.C.C. 322, 325 (1966). Brinke proposed
to operate TOFC forwarder service out of Miami, Florida. His proposed tariff included
alternative higher rates to cover the eventuality that at any given time he might not have
an even number of trailers to "consolidate" on TOFC flatcars for a given destination. The
flatcars take two trailers; the railroads charge a higher per-trailer rate if a car carries only
one trailer. Brinke's opponents claimed that any movements of only one trailer on a flat
car would not involve consolidation and hence not be within the Interstate Commerce Act.
This argument was rejected by the Commission in the phrase quoted in the text. Sec also
Dinion Coil Co. v. International Forwarding Co., 304 LC.C. 1, 3 (1958) (in a shipper repara-
tion suit for overcharges on a carload shipment moving in forward service, held, forwarder
entitled to apply his rates to carload shipments if the shipper chose forwarder service, since
consolidation and break-bulk are not required on every shipment).
86. Forwarder Volume Commodity Rates, 310 I.C.C. 199, 203 (1960), afl'd sub nom.
Eastern Express, Inc. v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 256 (SD. Ind. 1961), aJ)d per cuiarm
369 U.S. 37 (1962).
87. The motor carriers have attacked forwarder provision of large shipment service on
the grounds that forwarders are somehow inherently limited to relatively small shipments.
The Commission has rejected this argument, holding, in effect, that the statutory consolida-
tion and break-bulk rules are the only effective limits on the size of forw'arder shipments.
Forwarder Volume Commodity Rates, 310 I.C.C. 199, 201, 203 (1960).
88. It would be necessary, as well, to clarify previous holdings which imply that a for-
warder must provide both consolidation and break-bulk service on any given shipment.
The "ordinary and usual" provision in the Act should be interpreted to provide that al-
though both services are normally provided in freight forwarder shipments, they need not
invariably be provided. See Class Rates, 303 I.C.C. 293, 298 (19538); Kagarise Freight For-
warder Application, 260 LC.C. 745, 747 (1946).
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the Interstate Commerce Act which permits shipper-loaded truckloads
to move in forwarder TOFC service should also permit the infrequent
movement of larger shipments. Large surface forwarder shipments will
be relatively infrequent because of the rule that direct carriers must
treat the forwarder as a shipper.8 9 When the forwarder is treated as any
other shipper, the direct carrier cannot publish rates for the exclusive
benefit of the forwarder by name. The rate may be structured in a man-
ner which makes it more likely to be used by forwarders than by other
shippers, but any shipper who can meet the specifications of the rate
may ship property under that rate. At present, most surface forwarder
shipments in rail service between consolidation and break-bulk points
move under "all-commodity" or "freight, all kinds" rates.10 If the for-
warder may utilize a rail all-commodity rate to ship carloads of a single
commodity at a lower rate than the rate nominally applicable to that
specific commodity, an ordinary rail shipper should likewise be able to
take advantage of that rate. When the shipper of carload lots can obtain
the same rate that the forwarder pays, the forwarder will find that he
can engage in carload operations only where he can provide premium
service. Since the forwarder and the shipper must pay the same basic rate
to the railroad, premium service will involve premium charges. Ordi-
narily, the large shipper's market power and internal transportation
expertise will make the forwarder's service superfluous. But if the ship-
per is willing to pay a premium, perhaps in order to obtain through
single-carrier service or to avoid the cost of maintaining transportation
expertise within his own firm, it should be possible for him to do so.
With one exception, elimination of which is recommended in connec-
tion with forwarder rate regulation,91 the argument applies equally
well to forwarder use of motor carrier services. If the forwarder begins
to handle straight truckload lots, he must provide some form of pre-
mium service in order to compete with the direct motor carriers.
No problems of statutory or regulatory restrictions on shipment size
arise in maritime forwarding. FMC regulations simply define the NVO
as an indirect carrier by water, selling water transportation as a
common carrier and arranging in its own name with underlying water
carriers for the actual transportation. 92 There is no requirement of the
89. See p. 1363 supra.
90. Cf. All-Commodity Rates, 293 I.C.C. 327 (1954); All Freight to Pacific Coast, 248
I.C.C. 73 (1941). It is clear that forvarders are not the exclusive beneficiaries of such rates:
large volume, general merchandise shippers are also substantial users of them, 248 I.C.C.
at 82-83.
91. See pp. 1381-85 infra.
92. 46 C.F.R. § 510.21(d) (1966).
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performance of consolidation and break-bulk services, and therefore no
need to change the maritime regulations to conform to the change
recommended for ICC-regulated fonarders. Nor in fact is there any
substantial likelihood of controversy over NVO consolidation and
break-bulk service: the single unit of transportation-the ocean cargo
vessel-is so large that break-bulk and consolidation are likely to be an
inevitable part of the NVO's service.
Freight Forwarder Rate Regulation
In the Lehigh Valley case, the Supreme Court established the prin-
ciple that regulated direct carriers must charge forwarders their pub-
lished tariff rates for transportation services. 3 Were it not for a partial
exception to this principle for forwarder shipments moving by motor
carrier, there would be no good reason for independently regulating
freight forwarder rates, except to eliminate special discriminations for
or against particular shippers. The maximum rates which the for-
warder could charge without providing better service than the under-
lying carrier would be fixed by the rates available to shippers from the
underlying carriers themselves. Correspondingly, the minimum rates
could be no less on a per-pound basis than the rates the forwarder
would have to pay the underlying carrier, for otherwise the fonarder
would operate at an out-of-pocket loss. Should any rate distortions occur
within this limited range, they will not be long-lasting: entry into
forwarding is so easy that no single competitor is likely to acquire
significant market power.
The forwarders, however, have never been happy with the Lehigh
Valley doctrine: they argue that the direct carriers achieve certain
economies in the movement of forwarder traffic not applicable to the
traffic of other shippers, and that these economies should be reflected in
lower rates for forwarder shipments. Ideally, the forwvarders seek to be
recognized as carriers able to make joint rates with the underlying
carriers, with only the total, and not the division, subject to the
approval of a regulatory agency.94 While they have had no success with
this argument in air and rail transportation, the forwarders have ob-
tained partial relief from the Lehigh Valley principle in their trans-
actions with motor carriers; and therefore the regulated rates of the
motor carriers cannot serve as a competitive check on forwarder rates.
93. See notes 11-13 supra and p. 1363.
94. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2113 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
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Section 409 of the Interstate Commerce Act permits motor common
carriers to give special "contract" rates to surface forwarders. For line-
haul movements of up to 450 miles, these rates may be less than the
tariff rates of the motor carriers available to shippers in general. 5
The section 409 rate privilege, coupled with the recommendation
above, that forwarders be allowed to handle shipments of any size and
weight, may give the forwarder a substantial competitive advantage
over the regulated motor carrier, operating independently of the for-
warder. Low section 409 rates from a motor carrier would permit a
forwarder to charge a shipper truckload rates less than the going rates
of regulated motor common carriers for identical service.
Economic incentive to the motor carrier to offer such bargain rates to
the forwarders could exist in two situations. First, by offering section
409 rates to a cooperative freight forwarder, a motor carrier can effec-
tively lower its rates without going through the formalities of tariff
amendments. Section 409 rates, unlike ordinary motor carrier tariff
rates, are not open to investigation and suspension, so other carriers
cannot object to them. 6 This exemption for section 409 rates could
easily lend itself to selective "skimming" of profitable traffic. Section
409 rates would serve as the functional equivalent of discriminatory
rebates.
The second incentive could come from the use of "trip-leasing,"
where a holder of motor common carrier operating rights owns no
vehicles but obtains equipment on an as-needed basis, leasing it from
single vehicle owner-operators for individual trips. Because the owner-
operator may be seeking a back-haul, he will often be willing to accept
a lease rate barely above his out-of-pocket costs. The motor carrier can
then turn around and use section 409 to grant low contract rates to a
95. 49 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964). The section provided, after the 1950 Amendment, 64 Stat,
1114 (1950), that forwarders could establish contract rates with motor carriers, provided
that these rates did not unduly prejudice or prefer any of the participants thereto or any
other forwarder, and provided that no contract for line-haul service of 450 miles or more
could provide for rates less than those which the motor carriers are required to establish
under the rate-making provisions of Part II of the Act. section 409(b) of the Act and 49
C.F.R. § 400.1 (1964) require all section 409 rate agreements to be filed with the Commis.
sion, "on paper of good quality, size 81," x I"
Forwarder assembly and distribution services may also be provided by motor carriers on
section 409 rates. But this is a separate problem, more closely concerned with the type of
carrier a forwarder may use to provide this service, and is best considered in connectionwith the general problems of assembly and distribution services. see p p. 1391-95 infIra.
96. Section 409 requires only that all 409 contracts be filed with the ICM See note 95
supra. The ICC has indicated that it has not been able to do much with 409 rate contracts
except ifie them. Hearings on Freight Forwarder Acquisitions (S. 684) Before the Surface
Transportation Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Segs. 12
(1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Freight Forwarder Acquisition Hearings].
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freight forwarder. He thereby evades the regulation of his own rates
and is able to give the forwarder lower rates than he can obtain from a
motor carrier which operates its own fleet of vehicles0 7 This, too, may
lend itself to the skimming of profitable traffic and selective rate-
cutting. In both cases, the combination of the motor carrier and freight
forwarder rates would be open to no regulatory control at all unless the
rates of the forwarder were themselves under direct supervision of the
regulatory agency.
Legislative prohibition of section 409 rates for all freight forwarder
line-haul shipments between consolidation and break-bulk points will
eliminate this difficulty. The forwarders, however, would surely claim
that this would bankrupt them and bar them from handling small ship-
ments as well as from handling truckload movements. But it should
be possible to develop a scheme which would continue to make lower
rates available to forwarders for their movements of consolidated small
shipments, while curtailing forwarder access to special rates for truck-
load movements.
First, all forwarder shipments, small or large, should be able to move
at lower rates via any direct carrier if lower direct carrier costs are in
fact incurred in handling forwarder shipments. Although quantity dis-
counts based on transportation requirements contracts are illegal,0s
regulatory commissions are still expected to accept rates which are
97. An example of just this kind of forwarder involvement in truckload service through
the medium of section 409 rates is found in Motor Rail Co., 296 I.CC. 205 (1955).
98. The railroads cannot grant quantity discounts to shippers on the condition that the
shipper tender a minimum proportion of his shipments to the railroad. Contract Rates,
313 I.C.C. 247, aff'd sub nom. New York Central R. Co. v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 947
(1951), aff'd per curiamr 368 US. 349 (1962). The same rule applies to motor common car-
riers, Liquified Petroleum Gas, 16 Fed. Car. Cases 35,859 (1965). In air transportation.
freight tariffs include several weight breaks at which the cost per pound drops, a practice
which is probably justified by cost savings in handling larger shipments. But the CAB has
also permitted the use of "blocked-space' agreements, whereby a carrier buys space at a
flat fee, whether or not he uses it for shipping anything, at a rate substantially lower than
regular rates. American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.) (Afl'g CAB Economic
Order 21160), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). This is arguably different from a minimum
percentage requirement contract, for here the rate is open to a shipper with no restrictions
upon the disposition of his total air transport requirements. Rates of this kind serve a
different purpose than the requirements contracts invalidated in Contract Rates, supra.
Air cargo services are largely scheduled services primarily involving small shipments.
"Blocked-space" rates assure the carrier of revenue for space which, if not used, would be
moved anyway by the carrier, there is no way to move one-half of a DC-8. The rates in
Contract Rates were for multiples, rather than fractions, of the unit capacity of the carrier.
By these rates, the carrier was not obtaining payment for transportation which it vould
necessarily perform under any circumstances. Only in maritime transportation are "re-
quirements-contract" rates permissible under the dual rate system approved by Congress
in 1961, 75 Stat. 762 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1964), amending the Shipping Act of 1916.
But because maritime tariffs include few or no weight breaks (see p. 1372 supra), this
will not permit the NVO to obtain rate advantages for large shipments which the shipper
himself could not obtain.
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based on cost differences.90 In the simplest case, a shipper who tenders
ten carloads at once may obtain a lower per-car rate than a shipper
who tenders only one car at a time. Moreover, rates reflecting the cost
savings in doing business with forwarders would hardly deviate from
present law.100 Section 408 of the Interstate Commerce Act presently
permits motor carriers to publish special rates for surface forwarder
assembly and distribution services when those services can be provided
at a lower cost than ordinary short-haul small shipment services,' 0 '
Secondly, the agencies should permit special rates for all large-
volume, mixed-commodity shipments, whether the carrier is dealing
with a forwarder who consolidates small shipments or a large-scale
shipper of mixed commodities. Rates of this kind have existed for some
time in rail service.1 2 They are theoretically open to all shippers but
typically include geographic and commodity-mix restrictions which
make them suitable for use only by freight forwarders and high-volume
general merchandise shippers.10 3 Motor carriers instituting rates with
similar restrictions should be able to avoid any loss of revenue resulting
from shipper desire to move truckload single-commodity shipments at
99. Minimum volume rates, on the other hand, appear to be acceptable to the ICC In
two situations. First, low rates for very high minima have been approved, typically to re-
tain traffic which would otherwise be lost to non-regulated transportation. Typically these
rates are for power-station coal, to meet the threat of mine-mouth or oil-fired generating
plants, as in Coal from Ky., 308 I.C.C. 99 (1959). Second, volume rates are permitted when
lower costs are dearly shown, Grain in Multiple Car Shipments, 325 I.C.C. 752 (1965). The
reasoning of these cases should apply to all modes of transportation.
100. It would be necessary, in order to stay within the limits of the Lehigh Valley prin.
ciple, to permit any shippers whose traffic meets the standards set for the forwarder rates
to take advantage of these rates. Direct carriers cannot set rates for forwarders qua for-
warders. The probability that only a few shippers will be able to meet the conditiong
should not in itself render the rate unreasonably discriminatory so long as the rate is cost-
related. Prior to surface forwarder regulation, the Supreme Court did affirm an ICC ruling
that forwarders could not receive lower rates from motor carriers than other shippers,
United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U.S. 344 (1940). But the rates dis-
allowed were for assembly and distribution services of less-than-truckload lots, and not for
line-haul service. Moreover, in that decision, the Court gave deference to the ICC's finding
that the rates challenged were in fact unequal rates covering substantially identical
services.
101. 49 U.S.C. § 1008 (1964). These rates may also be used by large shippers with mul.
tiple plants at either the shipping or receiving end. The most common non-forwarder user
would be a firm like Sears, Roebuck shipping in carload lots from a distribution center to
a major market area, with the shipment broken down for distribution to each retail store
at a central point in the market area, and moving to the individual stores on section 408
assembly and distribution rates.
102. See p. 1380 supra.
103. All-commodity rates for forwarder TOFC service normally apply only when no
commodity is more than 60 per cent of the shipment. Forwarder Volume Commodity Rates,
310 I.C.C. 199, 200 (1960). If the 60 per cent limit is exceeded, the charge to the forwarder
for the full trailerload is normally based on the dominant commodity. Since this rate will
normally be greater than the all-commodity rate, and will be approximately the same rate
available to the true owner of the property, the railroad will have lost little or no revenue
because the shipment has moved in forwarder service instead of being turned over directly
to the railroad by the true owner.
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all-commodity rates whenever the all-commodity rate is lower than the
single-commodity rate.
This combination of a prohibition against rate concessions to for-
warder on single-commodity shipments which are not based on cost
savings, and a permissive policy toward motor vehicle "all-commodity"
or "freight, all kinds" rates, would prevent forwarders from obtaining
an undue advantage over motor common carriers for single-commodity
truckload movements. At the same time, this policy should not interfere
significantly with the movement in forwarder service of consolidated
small shipments. That is, the forwarders should be able to survive
without the benefit of section 409 rates between consolidation and
break-bulk points. If the forwarder handles carload or truckload ship-
ments, it will be on the basis of service advantages it provides the
shipper (such as intermodal coordination in export service), and not
because of rate concessions that only a forwarder is able to obtain from
the underlying carrier.
Turning to the maritime field, in domestic offshore traffic the FMC
has regulatory powers over carrier rates paralleling those of the ICC
and the CAB.104 In foreign trade, however, the FMC has only the power
to disapprove rates which do not meet the statutory standards. 1' Al-
though the direct maritime carrier and the NVO are subject to the
same standards, the FMG appears to have made no effort to oversee the
rates charged by the NVO's beyond requiring that they comply with
the act by filing their tariffs with the FMC. 1 °0
Presumably, the Lehigh Valley doctrine applies in the maritime
industry. FMC regulations governing the operations of the shipper's
agent (commonly called the "independent ocean freight forwarder" but
unrelated to the NVO) in the maritime industry indicate that an NVO
is in violation of the law if it accepts rebates or special privileges from
the direct ocean carriers, unless these privileges are available to all
shippers and are not classified as rebates by the FMC. 10T If the steam-
ship operators persist in granting differentially lower rates to the
NVO's, the FMC would appear to have the power to order their re-
moval whenever they constitute an unreasonable preference or preju-
dice.
It is probably safe to assume that the FMC and the CAB will con-
104. 46 U.S.C. § 817(a) (1964).
105. 46 U.S.C. §§ 815 First, 816, 817(b) (1964).
106. Common Carriers by Water-Status of Non-Vessel Carriers, 6 F.MJB. 245 (1961).
107. Cf. 30 Fed. Reg. 1849 (1965).
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tinue their policy of leaving freight forwarder rates substantially un-
regulated, and there is no need for special legislation to achieve this
purpose. Part IV of the Interstate Commerce Act, regulating surface
freight forwarders, does not lend itself to such simple solution. Section
406 may be construed as requiring the Commission to fix forwarder
rates wherever it believes existing rates are unreasonable. 1 8 Further-
more, the Commission is noticeably less sympathetic to unregulated
transportation than are the other regulatory agencies. These two facts
suggest that not only may it be necessary to permit the Commission to
exempt forwarders from maximum and minimum rate regulation: it
may also initially be necessary to require the ICC to grant the exemp-
tion when it is permitted by statute.
Forwarder exemption from general rate regulation is preferable to
statutory denial of this power. It would be over-optimistic to expect
that shippers will never complain of forwarder overcharging or dis-
crimination, or that direct carriers will never accuse forwarders of
misbilling shipments to gain more favorable rates.10 9 There are two
possible forums for resolving such disputes: the courts and the adju-
dicative administrative agencies. At present jurisdiction over such
questions as preferential or discriminatory rates, unlawful charges to
shippers and carriers, and rebating is given to the regulatory agencies.
It would create undesirable complications to diverge from this pattern
for the relatively small segment of transportation encompassed by
freight forwarding.
On the other hand, it would be equally undesirable to submit inter-
modal forwarders to the separate jurisdiction of the three agencies on
questions of this sort. Disputes between shipper and forwarder, or
direct carrier and forwarder, would be a natural subject for the joint
board proposed above to oversee entry into freight forwarding.1 0 The
board should not, however, be given specific rate-fixing powers. Instead,
remedies for discriminatory or unjust forwarder practices should be
limited to reparations or cease and desist orders. To the extent that
forwarder practices found to be discriminatory or prejudicial involve
forwarder rates and are not already corrected or capable of being
corrected in the immediate future by competitive pressures, the for-
108. 49 U.S.C. § 1006(b) (1964) ("... it shall determine and prescribe the lawful
rate ...'.
109. This has been a perennial problem in air forwarding: the more marginal air for.
warders apparently have not always been able to resist the temptation to submit to the
direct air carriers a 450 pound shipment at a billing weight closer to 400 pounds.
110. See p. 1377 supra.
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warder ought to be permitted to eliminate the wrong as he sees fit-
either by bringing the discriminatory rates into line with his general
rate structure, or by bringing other rates into line with the heretofore
discriminatory rates.
Ownership and Control of Forwarders
An additional area of concern is the affiliations between direct and
indirect carriers. At present each agency has its own standard. The
CAB is consistently opposed to ownership or control relations between
air forwarders and air carriers. It has not exempted the air forwarder
from the statutory provisions requiring CAB approval of interlocking
relationships between air carriers and others engaged in aeronautics,
and of agreements affecting competition in air transportation?1 ' It
forbids acquisition of air forwarders by other common carriers when, in
its judgment, such acquisitions would be detrimental to the develop-
ment of air cargo service." 2
The maritime NVO is subject to the same rules as the direct mari-
time carrier. Since no control or entry restrictions presently apply to
transportation under FMC jurisdiction, there is no statutory provision
for FMC supervision over relations between NVO's and direct carriers.
The only potential control stems from the requirement that all agree-
ments restricting competition between persons subject to the Act (so-
called "section 15 agreements") be filed with the FMC, which has the
power to disapprove those it finds to be unduly restrictive and not in
the public interest."13
The surface forwarders under ICC regulation are subjected to more
detailed statutory control of their relationships with direct carriers.
Sections 410 and 411 of the Interstate Commerce Act permit a direct
carrier subject to the Act or person controlling or controlled by a direct
carrier, to acquire control of a surface fowarder. But an ICC direct
carrier may not itself receive a surface forwarder permit, and a surface
forwarder, or person controlling or controlled by a surface forwarder,
111. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1378-79, 1382 (1964). See Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B. 473,
500 (1948).
112. The Board has statutory power to deny such acquisitions if it finds that they will
restrain competition or will not satisfy the requirement that they promote the public in-
terest. Section 408(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1964). The CAB
interprets the Act to apply a similar rule even when surface carriers desire to enter air
forwarding in their own names, rather than through subsidiaries or acquisitions, a rela-
tionship not technically within the prohibitions of section 408. Air Freight Forwarding
Case, 9 C.A.B. 473, 502 (1948). See note 52 supra, discussing CAB restrictions on surface
carrier entrance into air forwarding.
113. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
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may not acquire control of an ICC-regulated direct carrier.114 Although
the surface forwarders have sought permission to acquire surface direct
carriers, or, in the alternative, to block surface carrier acquisition of
forwarders, their efforts have been fruitless. 15 They do have grounds
for dissatisfaction, because there are no persuasive economic arguments
for the ICC's asymmetrical policy on acquisitions." 0
Although the ICC has indicated a preference for placing control
relationships between direct carriers and surface forwarders under
section five of the Interstate Commerce Act,117 it would be more sen-
sible to abandon the regulation of these relationships for all modes of
transportation. There are two objections to unrestricted control rela-
tionships between direct and indirect carriers. First, it is feared that the
direct carriers may, via their subsidiaries, monopolize the market for
indirect transportation services. By receiving special treatment from
the parent company, the subsidiary freight forwarder would be able to
give better service at equal rates, or equal service at lower rates, and
thus obtain a freight forwarding monopoly. But a direct carrier oper-
ating in a competitive market will find that discriminatory service or
prices designed to freeze out independent forwarders will simply cause
these forwarders to shift to other direct carriers, and the would-be
monopolist will, instead, be faced with a declining market share. The
direct carrier with a monopoly should be indifferent to the degree of
competition among forwarders. It can establish a single rate schedule
for all forwarders so that, allowing for the return on investment neces-
sary to keep the forwarders in the market, the forwarders "produce" at
the level of output which maximizes the direct carrier's profits. It can
do no better by setting up its own forwarding subsidiary and discrimi-
nating against its independent competitors, for, in the first situation,
the direct carrier has already obtained all of the monopoly profits to be
made in that market. Only if the direct carrier is subject to effective
maximum rate regulation would it be desirable to monopolize for-
warder traffic via a subsidiary. Regulated maximum rates will prohibit
114. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1010(c), 1011(a), (g) (1964). See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., 1963 Freight Forwarder Acquisition Hearing; Hearings on Freight For.
warder Legislation (S. 3365, etc.) Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
116. Statement of L. Walrath, Chairman, ICC, 1963 Freight Forwarder Acquisition
Hearings 4-5. On the problem which can arise from these provisions, see Calore Express
Co., 87 M.C.C. 379 (1961).
117. The ICC has proposed either placement of all surface carrier-surface forwarder
relationships under section five of the Interstate Commerce Act, or prohibition of all own-
ership or control relations between direct and indirect surface carriers, including severance
of existing ties. It prefers the former alternative. 1963 Freight Forwarder Acquisition Hear-
ings 5, 10-11.
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the direct carrier from exploiting its monopoly position when it sells
transportation services to shippers, including fonvarders. But if the
direct carrier can exclude independent forwarders by providing them
with inadequate service, its own forwarder subsidiary (whose rates, by
our hypothesis, are unregulated) will be able to obtain a monopoly of
the market for forwarder services.
118
Monopoly achieved by discrimination, however, violates existing
law. The Lehigh Valley doctrine bars any form of preferential rates or
rebates from direct carriers to freight forivarders, subsidiaries or in-
dependents."9° It should apply equally strongly to service discrimina-
tion, for there is no economic distinction between favoritism in rates
and favoritism in service.120 The regulatory agencies therefore have
ample authority to prevent the regulated monopolist from achieving a
second monopoly in the forwarder market.
The second objection is that the captive forwarders will rig their
tariffs so that their shipments travel via the affiliated direct carrier for
as long as possible. This will involve non-optimal resource allocation
if total shipment costs would have been minimized by a different com-
bination of transport modes; in effect, the carrier will be providing
inferior service. But given free entry into freight forwarding, the direct
carrier controlling a forwarder can sustain inferior service only by
taking a loss on the subsidiary's freight forwarding operations or by
giving its subsidiary rate or service advantages not available to in-
dependent forvarders. The rate and service advantages are, as has
already been shown, illegal under existing law: the direct carrier must
118. The volume of monopoly profits available in forwarding is likely to be relatively
small. The demand for forwarder services depends both on the existence of alternative
means of transportation and the demand for the product being transported. Man)y small-
scale shippers may have a ready alternative to the freight forwarder in the lessthan-truck-
load services of the motor carriers. Others, if dependent on forwarder serice, may not be
competitive in their product markets if their costs rise vis-bk-vis more advantageously
located producers, and will simply stop shipping.
119. Lehigh Valley R.P, v. United States, 243 U.S. 444 (1917).
120. There seem to be no cases involving simple service discrimination; an assertion
of its illegality is but a reasonable extension of the existing law of carrier discriminatory
practices. Lehigh Valley was decided on the basis of sections 2 and 6 of the Interstate Com-
merce Act, 243 U.S. at 446. Section 2 prohibits collection of differential compensation for
the performance of "like ...service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions . . .", 49 U.S.C. § 2 (1964). Identical
compensation for different levels of service should fall within this proscription. Similarly.
the Elkins Act (which provides spedal penalties, including injunctive relief, for its %iola-
tion) forbids carriers to give "any rebate, concession, or discrimination ... whereby
Itransportation is provided below published tariff rates or] ... any other advantage is
given or discrimination is practiced . 49 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1964). The Supreme Court
has commented, "In fact, favoritism which destroys equality between shippers, however
brought about, is not tolerated." Union Pacific R.P. v. United States, 313 US. 450, 462
(1941) (applying the Elkins Act).
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provide independent forwarders with the same rates and services it
makes available to its subsidiary. If the controlling direct carrier is
content with sub-normal profits from the subsidiary's indirect carrier
operations, we may not understand it, but there are no apparent
reasons for subjecting this generosity to legal sanctions.
A rational economic basis for discrimination in favor of a forwarder
subsidiary does exist, of course, when the common control results in
efficiencies not obtainable by the independent forwarder. The history
of forwarder relations with direct carriers before forwarders were
brought under regulation in 1942 does not suggest that appreciable
economies exist. But if there are such efficiencies, there is no good
reason to prohibit them, at least until Congress establishes a coherent
policy against corporate size.
A similar argument should apply to forwarder ownership or control
of direct carriers. The Lehigh Valley doctrine would still bar the
"captive" direct carrier from granting lower rates to the parent for-
warder, unless it at the same time granted lower rates to all other
forwarders and shippers similarly situated. And in a market in which
there is easy entry, selective price-cutting to drive other forwarders out
of the market, financed by profits earned elsewhere by the direct
carrier, would not be a profit-maximizing course of action for the
controlling forwarder; it would in effect be sacrificing normal profits
in order to maintain a monopoly.
Theory therefore suggests that there should be no restrictions on
financial or corporate relationships between direct and indirect carriers
so long as direct carrier rate regulation and the Lehigh Valley doctrine
continue to apply. Two alternatives are available to those who fear the
unforeseen deviant case. The anti-trust laws could be invoked. But since
indirect carrier-direct carrier relationships resemble vertical integra-
tion between wholesaler (or producer) and retailer, and since anti-trust
law has not been conspicuously successful in formulating a coherent
theory of vertical integration, this would be an unsatisfactory means of
public control. The second possibility is to rely upon the tripartite
board proposed above in connection with entry and discriminatory
forwarder rate practice. The legal definition of forwarder discrimi-
natory practices could be formulated to include prohibition of single-
handed or joint attempts at monopolization of indirect carrier services.
These prohibitions would apply both to forwarders and to direct
carriers in control relationships with forwarders, although provision
ought to be made for the situation in which common control of direct
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and indirect carrier services creates efficiencies which cannot be matched
by the independent forwarder.
Freight Forwarder Provision of Assembly and Distribution Services
It will be particularly difficult to establish a uniform pattern of
regulation for the forwarders' assembly and distribution services. Al-
though freight forwarders are normally forbidden to move shipments
by any means other than regulated common carriers, surface and air
forwarders are allowed to use unregulated motor transport for assembly
and distribution services covering relatively short distances.' Because
the air and surface forwarder exemptions are not identical, each type
of forwarder-maritime, surface and air-is subject to a different set of
rules governing assembly and distribution services. Their contradictory
requirements would severely burden an intermodal freight forwarder.
To use the existing exemptions, the intermodal forivarder would be
required to separate shipments moving in assembly and distribution
service both on the basis of the line-haul carrier which moved them
from consolidation to break-bulk point and according to the distance
involved in the assembly or distribution operation.
Among the three classes of forwarders, the clearest regulations apply
to maritime NVO's: they can provide no surface assembly and distribu-
tion services at all, exempt or otherwise. The Interstate Commerce Act
exemption from motor carrier regulation of water carrier terminal
area pickup and delivery services applies only to water carriers under
ICC regulation .1 22 But most NVO's have a separate status as surface
carriers (direct or indirect), which will define their rights to provide
unregulated motor vehicle assembly and distribution services.1M
Section 202(c) of the Interstate Commerce Act permits surface for-
warders to use their own vehicles or those of others for "the perfor-
mance within terminal areas of transfer, collection, or delivery ser-
vices . . . ."' Common carrier authority is not required for these
services: forwarder terminal area service is regulated as part and parcel
of the forwarder service itself. 5 All surface forwarder service beyond
121. 49 U.S.C. § 1018 (1964); 14 C.F.R. §§ 296-97 (1966).
122. 49 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1964). Trans-Caribbean Motor Transport, Inc., 66 M.C.C. 593,
597 (1956).
123. E.g., the carriers who were parties to Common Carriers by Water-Status of Non-
Vessel Carriers, 6 F.M.B. 245 (1961).
124. 49 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1964).
125. 49 U.S.C. §§ 302(c), 1010(h), 1018 (1964). Forwarders may, in the alternative, hire
unregulated carriers to perform such service. See note 39 supra. In such a situation, the
service is to be regulated as though it were performed by the forwarder himself.
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the terminal area (which rarely extends more than five miles beyond
the corporate limits of the central municipality) must utilize the
services of a common carrier authorized by the ICC to operate between
the consolidation or break-bulk points and the consignor or consignee
of the shipment.
126
Prior to motor carrier regulation, the forwarders negotiated for
special rate reductions for all assembly and distribution services, but
thereafter, non-tariff forwarder assembly and distribution rates were
held illegal under the Lehigh Valley principle.1 27 However, section 409
of the Interstate Commerce Act, discussed above in reference to for-
warder line-haul movements, 128 also permits forwarders to obtain favor-
able contract rates for assembly and distribution services. 2 At present,
almost all surface forwarder assembly and distribution services beyond
the exempt terminal area move on section 409 rates.
Indirect air carrier provision of assembly and distribution services
for air cargo is subject to a third set of rules. Section 203(b)(7a) of the
Interstate Commerce Act,"a0 exempting the transportation of property
by motor vehicle from economic regulation by the ICC when "inci-
dental to transportation by aircraft," has been construed by the ICC to
permit air carriers (direct and indirect) to operate exempt motor
vehicle transportation within a distance of twenty-five miles from the
airports served by the carrier.131 The ICC has further construed section
203(b)(7a) to mean that an air forwarder cannot act as an indirect
carrier beyond the limits of the exemption provided by 203(b)(7a)
126. 49 U.S.C. § 1018 (1964). The ICC has defined the terminal zones of freight for
warders and motor carriers as equal to the "commercial zone" in section 203(b)(8) of the
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 303(b)(8) (1964), within which exempt local cartage carriers are permitted
to operate. Commercial Zones and Terminal Areas, 54 M.C.C. 21, 64-66 (1952); 49 C.F.R.
§§ 170.45, 170.48 (1964). The formula for determining the limits of a commercial zone for
cities of 5,000 to 100,000 or more inhabitants is at 49 C.F.R. § 170.16 (1964). Section 170
also contains exceptions to the general formula for specific cities.
127. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 17 AT.C.C. 549 (1939), aJ'd, 30 F. Supp. 968 (S,..NY. 1940),
aff'd per curiam 309 U.S. 638 (1940).
128. See pp. 1381-82 supra. Section 409 did not take its present form until 1950, 64
Stat. 1114 (1950). An outline of the events between 1942 and 1949 may be found in
Hearings on S. 2113 Before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1949).
129. 49 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964). See note 95 supra. The forwarders and motor carriers have
arranged for assembly and distribution service rates under section 409 rather than under
section 408, 49 U.S.C. § 1008 (1964); see p. 1384 supra. The shortcoming of section 408
apparently is the requirement that the rates be tariff rates available to all comers; the
motor carriers feel that assembly and distribution services need to be tailored more
closely to the individual forwarder than section 408 permits in order to avoid committing
themselves to the provision of unprofitable service.
130. 49 U.S.C. § 303(b)(7a) (1964).
131. Motor Transportation of Property Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft, 95
M.C.C. 71 (1964), 49 C.F.R. § 210.45 (1967 Supp.).
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without obtaining surface forwarder authority from the ICC.132 Lack-
ing this authority, the air forwarder is limited to charging his appli-
cable rate to (or from) the air terminal. The published motor carrier
tariff rate between the air terminal and the ultimate origin or destina-
tion points must apply to the surface portion of the trip, and the air
forwarder must make it clear to shippers that the motor carrier is
performing a connecting service, with the air fonvarder assuming no
common carrier liability for that portion of the journey.1'
The intermodal freight forwarder will, at one and the same time, be
an air, maritime and surface forwarder, and this will smooth out some
of the contradictions in the three regulatory schemes. The intermodal
forwarder will not be affected by the limitations on assembly and
distribution services provided by air and maritime fonarders. The
forwarder will be able to act in his alter ego as surface forwarder when
he handles air or maritime shipments, and accordingly will be governed
by the rules applicable to surface freight forvarder assembly and dis-
tribution service.
This, however, is only half the solution. Section 203(b)(7a) specifi-
cally exempts service "incidental" to air transportation from all ICC
economic regulation,134 whereas section 202(c) merely states that surface
forwarder collection and delivery service within terminal areas will be
regulated as part of forwarder service, instead of being separately
regulated as motor carrier service under Part II of the Interstate Com-
merce Act.135 The two sections therefore remain incompatible with
regard to the forwarder assembly and distribution services which may
be performed only by regulated motor common carriers: the air for-
warder may utilize a carrier not subject to ICC economic regulation for
journeys of up to twenty-five miles, while the surface fonvarder may
utilize an unregulated carrier only within its terminal area as defined
by the ICC, a distance normally much less than tventy-five miles.13
Because section 202(c) regulates both motor carrier and surface
freight forwarder terminal area services, and 203(b)(7a) regulates both
direct and indirect air carrier pickup and delivery services, any change
132. Panther Cartage Co., 88 M.C.C. 37 (1961).
133. Motor Transportation of Property Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft, 95
M.C.C. 71, 89-90 (1964). See 49 C.F.R. § 404.1 (1967 Supp.), where these rules are set forth
in more detail. The power of the ICC to establish rules of this form was affirmed in Air
Dispatch, Inc. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Pa. 194), affd per curiamn 381 U.S.
412 (1965).
134. 49 U.S.C. § 303(b)(7a) (1964).
135. 49 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1964).
136. See pp. 1591-93.
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in either provision will have some effect upon the existing competitive
balance between one or both pairs of carriers. The solution which
would least disturb the existing balance would be the definition of
"terminal area" service and service "incidental to transportation by
aircraft" as service performed within identical areas.137 This regulation-
free area ought to be somewhat larger than the present commercial
zones as defined by the ICC,138 to which surface forwarder terminal
areas are presently equated. Whereas the present commercial zone
rarely extends much more than five miles from the limits of the central
city of the zone, the "terminal area" proposed for redefinition here
should be defined to include the major economic tributaries of the
central city. Mechanical rules, like the current five and twenty-five mile
limits, may relieve the regulatory commissions from creative responsi-
bility, but they bear little relationship to a city's economic geography. 13
This recommendation would cut down substantially upon the service
which air carriers, direct and indirect, may provide free of all ICC
regulation, but it would be counter-balanced by two factors. First, the
traffic moving by indirect air carrier would have access to section 409
contract rates, for the indirect air carrier could become at will an
indirect surface carrier. This would provide the indirect carrier with
rates lower than the published motor carrier tariff rates for surface
movements beyond the newly-defined terminal areas.140 Second, the
137. This definition avoids the question of the size of the terminal areas within which
rail companies, express companies, and water carriers subject to the ICC's authority may
perform transfer, collection, and delivery services under section 202(c). Ilecause the ICC
has not attempted to fix limits to the terminal areas of these carriers, they are currently
free to fix their own terminal areas in the tariffs they publish, subject to ICC disapproval.
138. See note 126 supra.
139. The introduction of this larger terminal area is likely to raise questions about the
extent of the exemption granted to local cartage carriers, which, under Section 203(bi(8)
of the Interstate Commerce Act, may be exempted from all economic regulation withiin
the commercial zone of a city. 49 U.S.C. § 303(b)(8) (1964). This paper does not seek to deal
with the problem of the local cartage carrier. If good arguments can be made that it
would be unwise to extend the area of regulatory freedom granted these carriers, the ICC
need only end its present policy, not demanded by the statute, of equating the section
202(c) "terminal area" and the section 203(b)(8) "commercial zone."
140. Reliance upon section 409 contract rates for assembly and distribution service
beyond the regulation-free indirect carrier terminal area may create one difficulty. The
argument for freedom of indirect carriers from rate regulation depended upon their use
of direct carrier rates which were themselves subject to regulation. If very long distance
assembly and distribution services appear, the line-haul element of the total cost to the
forwarder could decrease in importance, and hence would be a lesser constraint on the
rates which the forwarder gives to the public. See p. 1381 supra. It is conceivable
that competition among motor carriers through the medium of unrestricted section
409 rates might result in substantial instability among indirect carriers and motor
carriers. Compare the problems involved in the use of section 409 rates for the provision
of line-haul services for forwarders, pp. 1381-83 supra. Section 409 does empower
the ICC to insure that section 409 contracts are not prejudicial to either of the
participants or to other freight forwarders, but the ICC has rarely exercised this power,
Testimony of L. Walrath, ICC Chairman, 1963 Freight Forwarder Acquisition Hearings 12.
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access of the indirect air carrier to section 409 contract rates would be
paralleled by the right of the direct air carrier (and only the direct air
carrier) to establish joint rates with surface direct carriers for through
service.141 A joint rate between a local and a long distance carrier is
normally less than the sum of the two independent rates published for
the line-haul and the local portions of the journey.1 2 In surface for-
warding, section 409 contracts are believed to result in the same split
between the line-haul motor carrier and the forwarder as would result
from the division of a joint rate between local and long-haul motor
carrier.143 Assuming similar results would arise from agreements be-
tween direct air carriers and motor carriers, air shipments would be
subject to substantially identical rates whether the air portion of the
movement were handled in the first instance by a direct or an indirect
air carrier.
Moreover, if it appeared that regular common carriers are unable to
fill the specialized needs of air transportation service beyond the limits
of the newly-defined terminal area, the ICC could expand its existing
practice of certifying motor common carriers limited solely to the
transportation of property with a prior or subsequent movement by
air.'" Motor common carriers limited to the transportation of property
with a prior or subsequent movement by indirect carrier would be able
to provide the specialized assembly and distribution service which a
general-commodities motor common carrier might be unwilling to
attempt.
This proposal would leave the relative competitive position of sur-
Should section 409 rates for assembly and distribution services beyond thc terminal area
limits become seriously disruptive, it might be necessary to fall back upon section 403 of
the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1008 (1964). See note 128 and p. 1384
supra. The alternative to section 409 contract rates are open tariff rates published
especially for assembly and distribution services, but subject to ICC eamination (like any
other tariff rate) to determine whether they are justified by the costs of performing the
service.
If assembly and distribution services beyond terminal area limits must be provided on
tariff rates, the ability of indirect carriers to arrange speedy, flexible pickup and delivery
service probably will be impaired. Because tariff rates, even under section 408, must be
filed well in advance of their effective date and are subject to investigation and suspension,
changes in rates may lag substantially behind changes in traffic. Therefore the goal of en-
hancing intermodal coordination through the encouragement of the indirect carrier would
appear to call for the retention of section 409 contract rates for assembly and distribution
services, at least until it can be demonstrated that this retention is undesirable.
141. Federal Aviation Act § 1003(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1483(b) (1964).
142. That is, the separate motor carrier rate from New Haven to New York may be
$3.50 per hundred pounds, and the air rate to Los Angeles from New " York $20.05 per
hundred. A joint rate might be $31.00, New Haven to Los Angeles, with $28.00 going to the
air carrier and $3.00 to the motor carrier. [These figures are purely hypothetical.]
143. 1963 Freight Forwarder Acquisition Hearings 23. (Testimony of Giles Morrow,
General Counsel, Freight Forwarders Institute.)
144. See White Air Freight Service, Inc., 95 M.C.C. 616 (19%-).
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face forwarders and motor carriers unchanged. Both would benefit
from the expansion of terminal areas. The motor carrier might suffer
slightly because the forwarder will be able to utilize his own vehicles
for assembly and distribution service within a greater area; on the
other hand, if the forwarder can operate his own vehicles profitably in
this service, the motor carrier ought to be able to provide the service
under contract rates even within the terminal area, and still profit
from it.145
It will probably be necessary for Congress to erase the distinction
between surface forwarder terminal areas and air cargo ground trans-
portation incidental to transportation by aircraft. At present, only the
ICC, with its exclusive jurisdiction over motor carrier transportation,
can change terminal area definitions. But the ICC is prone to restrict
the scope of motor vehicle operations by non-motor carriers; and if it
refuses to adapt to intermodal forwarding, authority to determine the
size of indirect carrier terminal areas should be given to the inter-
agency joint board proposed above.
146
145. Surface forwarders in recent years have complained that the long-liaul motor
carriers are buying up local motor carriers and then (it is said) refusing to grant section 409
rates to the forwarders in order to capture more traffic for motor carrier less-than.truck.
load service. See 1963 Freight Forwarder Acquisition Hearings 17. The expansion of the
terminal areas of freight forwarders should ameliorate this difficulty if it is in fact serious,
146. See pp. 1377, 1386 supra.
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